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Abstract
A single seller faces a sequence of buyers with unit demand. The buyers are forwardlooking and long-lived but vanish (and are replaced) at a constant rate. The arrival
time and the valuation is private information of each buyer and unobservable to the
seller. Any incentive compatible mechanism has to induce truth-telling about the
arrival time and the evolution of the valuation.
We derive the optimal stationary mechanism, characterize its qualitative structure,
and derive a closed form solution. As the arrival time is private information, the
buyer can choose the time at which he reports his arrival. The truth-telling constraint
regarding the arrival time can be represented as an optimal stopping problem. The
stopping time determines the time at which the buyer decides to participate in the
mechanism. The resulting value function of each buyer cannot be too convex and
must be continuously differentiable everywhere, reflecting the option value of delaying
participation. The optimal mechanism thus induces progressive participation by each
buyer: he participates either immediately or at a future random time.
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1.1

Introduction
Motivation

We consider a classic mechanism design problem in a dynamic and stationary environment.
The seller wants to repeatedly sell a good (or service) to buyers with randomly evolving
valuation. The willingness to pay of each buyer is private information of the buyer and
evolves randomly over time. We assume a stationary environment in which each buyer is
replaced at random, and with a constant rate, by a new buyer whose initial willingness-topay is randomly drawn from a given distribution. The objective of the seller is to find a
stationary revenue maximizing policy in this dynamic environment. The choice of policy or
mechanism is unrestricted and may consist of leasing contracts, sale contracts, or any other
form of dynamic contract.
We depart from the earlier analysis of dynamic mechanisms in our treatment of the
participation decision of the buyer. We allow the buyer (he), once he has arrived in the
economy, to choose the time at which he enters into a contract with the seller (she). While
he can sign a contract with the seller immediately upon arrival, he has the option to postpone
the participation decision until a future date. The buyer therefore has the option to wait
and sign any contract only after he has received additional information about his willingness
to pay. In particular, he can time the acceptance of a contract until he has a sufficiently
high willingness to pay. Thus, both the incentive constraints that are in place after the
buyer has signed the contract and the participation constraints that are in place before the
buyer has signed the contract are fully responsive to the arrival of new information, and
are consequently represented as sequential constraints. In particular, the buyer can enter
the contract upon arrival or at any later time. His participation is therefore determined
progressively as he receives additional information. For brevity, we sometimes refer to the
current setting with interim participation and interim incentive constraints as progressive
mechanism design.
We can contrast this with the received perspective in dynamic mechanism design. There,
the seller knows the arrival time of the buyer in the economy and can commit herself to make
a single and once-and-for-all offer to the buyer at the moment of arrival. In particular, the
seller can commit herself to never make another offer to the buyer. These two features: (i)
the ability of the seller to time the offer to the arrival time of the buyer and (ii) the ability to
refrain from any future offers seem likely to be violated in many economic environments of
interest. For example, the consumer clearly has a choice when to sign up for a mobile phone
2

contract, a gym membership, or a service contract for a kitchen appliance. Importantly, as
the consumer waits, he may receive more information about his willingness to pay for the
product. Thus, relative to the specific assumption in the earlier literature, we allow the arrival
time and the identity of the buyer to be private information to the buyer. Consequently,
the contract or the menu of contracts cannot be timed to the arrival of the buyer and the
contract (or lack of contract) offer cannot be tied to the identity of the buyer. In a stationary
environment in which buyers arrive and depart at a balanced rate, we restrict attention to
the optimal stationary mechanism.
We view the relaxation of the two above mentioned restrictions as necessary steps to bring
the design of dynamic revenue maximizing mechanism closer to many interesting economic
applications. To the extent that these restrictions impose additional constraints on the seller,
they directly weaken the power of dynamic mechanism design. We therefore investigate the
impact of these additional constraints on the ability of the seller to raise revenues from the
buyers using dynamic contracts. The additional constraints for the seller are reflected in a
larger set of reporting strategies for the buyers. A buyer can misreport both his willingness
to pay as well as his arrival time. This creates an option value for the buyer as instead of
choosing a contract immediately he can wait and enter into a contract with the seller when
it is most favorable for him to do so. Given the menu of contracts offered by the seller, the
buyer thus solves an optimal stopping problem to determine when to enter into a contractual
relationship with the seller. From the point of view of the buyer, the choice of an optimal
contract from the menu therefore has an option element. Subject to the (random) evolution
of his type and his willingness to pay, he can choose when to enter into an agreement with
the seller. This suggests that the buyer will receive a larger information rent than in the
standard dynamic mechanism design framework where the buyer has to sign a contract with
the seller immediately.
We develop our analysis in a continuous time setting where the buyer’s willingness to pay
follows a geometric Brownian motion. The prior distribution of the willingness to pay upon
arrival is given exogenously, and paired with the renewal rate in the population, generates
an ergodic distribution which forms the stationary environment. The revenue maximizing
static mechanism, i.e. the contract which does not condition on a buyer’s history, is a leasing
contract which offers the good in every period for the posted price that is optimal given the
ergodic distribution of the valuations of the buyers.
In the absence of the sequential participation constraint, the revenue maximizing dynamic mechanism would sell the object with probability one and forever at fixed price (see
3

Bergemann and Strack, 2015). Thus, the object would be sold rather than leased to all buyers who have an initial willingness to pay above a certain threshold. Conversely, all buyers
whose initial value is below this threshold would not buy the object, neither at the beginning
of time, nor anytime thereafter. In a first pass, we then restrict attention to a sales price
policy, which is optimal in the absence of sequential participation constraints, and determine
the optimal sales price with the presence of sequential participation constraints. Here, the
comparison of thresholds and prices between dynamic and progressive mechanism design are
instructive. We find that the threshold for the willingness to pay at which a buyer purchases
the object is strictly higher in the progressive model than in the dynamic model without
progressive participation constraint. By contrast, the price at which the buyer can acquire
the object can be either below or above the price charged in the dynamic setting.
We can gain some initial insight by considering how a buyer would react to the option to
buy at a fixed price. In the dynamic setting, there would be a threshold type for the buyer
who would receive zero expected net surplus at the offered price. In the progressive setting,
this threshold type could and clearly should delay the purchase until his willingness to pay
is sufficiently above the threshold level to guarantee himself a positive net surplus. Thus,
at any threshold level, the seller will be able to extract less surplus from the buyer than
he could in the presence of a static participation constraint. In response to the weakened
ability to extract surplus, the seller has to adjust her policy along the price and the quantity
margin at the same time. We show that the seller will generally choose to implement a higher
threshold for the willingness to pay. Thus, there will be fewer initial sales relative to the
static participation constraint. But the seller also adjusts along the dimension of the price
and will ask for a price below the price at which the threshold type would have received zero
expected net surplus. Interestingly, the price with sequential participation constraints may
either be below or above the price charged under the static participation constraint. Most
importantly, a gap now arises between the price paid to receive the object and the expected
value assigned to the object by the threshold type.
Following the analysis of the optimal price policy under sequential participation constraint, we then show that a single sale price policy is indeed an optimal progressive mechanism in the class of all possible stationary mechanisms. In other words, a single sale price
as a specific and simple indirect implementation of a direct mechanism achieves the revenue
maximizing optimum. The main challenge for establishing this result is that it is unclear
how to handle the progressive participation constraint. As our example with the threshold
type illustrates, this constraint will always bind for some type and thus cannot be ignored.
4

This constraint is non-standard as it states that the value function of the buyer must be the
solution to an optimal stopping problem which itself involves the value function. We relax
this problem by restricting the buyer to a small set of deviations, namely cut-off strategies
which are indexed by the cut-off. This relaxation has the advantage that the buyer’s participation strategies can be mapped into R which allows us to reduce the problem into a static
mechanism design problem. This static problem is a variant of the classical setup by Mussa
and Rosen (1978) with the non-standard feature that each buyer can (deterministically) increase his type at the cost of multiplicatively decreasing his interim utility. This additional
constraint leads to a failure of the first-order approach. We show that the resulting mathematical program can be expressed as a Pontryagin control problem with contact constraints
and we develop a verification result for such problems which might be of independent interest. We illustrate the implications that the option to wait has for the effectiveness of
dynamic mechanism in a concluding example.

1.2

Related Literature

The analysis of revenue-maximizing mechanism in an environment where the buyer’s private
information changes over time started with Baron and Besanko (1984) and Besanko (1985).
Since these early contributions, the literature has developed considerably in recent years with
notable contributions by Courty and Li (2000), Battaglini (2005), Eső and Szentes (2007)
and Pavan et al. (2014).1 These papers derive in increasing generality the dynamic revenue
maximizing mechanism. The analysis in these contributions have in common the same set of
constraints on the choice of mechanism. The seller has to satisfy all of the sequential incentive
constraints, but only a single ex-ante participation constraint. In earlier work, Bergemann
and Strack (2015), we considered the same set of constraints in a continuous-time setting
where the stochastic process that describes the evolution of the flow utility was governed
by a Brownian motion. The continuous-time setting allowed us to obtain additional and
explicit results regarding the nature of the optimal allocation policy, which are unavailable
in the discrete-time setting. In the present paper, we will use the continuous-time setting
again for very similar reasons.
The literature on dynamic mechanism design largely assumes that the arrival time of the
buyer is known to the seller and that the seller can make a single, take-it-or-leave-it offer at
the moment of the buyer’s arrival. In contrast, there is a separate literature that analyzes the
1

Bergemann and Välimäki (2019) provide a survey into the recent developments of dynamic mechanism
design.
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optimal sales of a durable good with the recurrent entry of new consumers, and it is directly
concerned with the timing of the purchase decision by the buyers. The seminal contribution
by Conlisk et al. (1984) considers a durable good model with the entry of a new group of
consumers in every period, constant in size and composition. Each buyer has either a low or
high value that is persistent. They consider the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game;
thus the seller has no commitment. The equilibrium displays a cyclic property. Sobel (1991)
considers a durable good model with the entry of new consumers. He extends the equilibrium
analysis of Conlisk et al. (1984) to allow for non-stationary equilibria and this enlarges the set
of attainable equilibria and payoffs. The model remains restricted to binary and persistent
types. The main part of his analysis is concerned with subgame perfect pricing policies by the
firm, thus he analyzes the pricing problem for the firm without commitment. In addition,
Sobel (1991) describes the optimal sales policy under commitment and establishes that a
stationary price is the optimal policy (Theorem 4). Board (2008) considers the optimal
commitment solution for seller when incoming demand for a durable good varies over time.
He characterizes the optimal sequence of prices and allocations in an optimal, possibly timedependent policy. While he considers a continuum of valuations, he maintains the restriction
that the value of each buyer is perfectly persistent and does not change after arrival.2 Thus,
the literature on newly arriving consumer restricts attention to: (i) a sequence of prices
rather than general allocation mechanisms, and (ii) perfectly persistent values.
Garrett (2016) offers a notable exception in that he is concerned with unobservable arrival
and allows for stochastic values. He considers a stationary environment in continuous time
in which each buyer arrives and departs at random times. The private value of each buyers
is governed by a Markov process with binary values, low and high. The seller can commit to
any deterministic time-dependent sales price policy. The seller maximizes the revenue from a
representative buyer. Garrett (2016) provides conditions under which a time-invariant price
path is optimal within the class of deterministic price path, and he obtains conditions on
the binary values under which a deterministic price cycle prevails in the optimal contract.
Garrett (2016) observes that an optimal policy in the class of all dynamic direct mechanisms,
one that does not restrict attention to deterministic sale price path (and implied restrictions
on reporting types), may lead to very different results and implications.
2

Besbes and Lobel (2015) consider a related question in a very different environment. They study the
revenue-maximizing pricing policy under commitment in a steady state where the consumers have private
information across two dimension: the valuation and their willingness to wait. The valuation of the consumer
however is constant and the willingness to wait is in terms of a deadline until the value expires. Thus each
consumer faces a finite horizon problem without discounting, and the seller maximizes her long-run average
revenue.
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By contrast, we consider an environment with a continuum of values whose evolution
is governed by a geometric Brownian motion. We allow for a general mechanism that can
depend in arbitrary ways on the reported values once the buyer has entered the mechanism.
We restrict attention to a stationary mechanism. Thus, the seller commits to renew the
mechanism in every future period either for newly arriving buyers, or late deciding buyers. In
this environment, we establish that a deterministic and time-invariant sale price constitutes
a revenue maximizing mechanism in the class of all stationary mechanisms. We discuss the
possibility of extending the optimality of our mechanism to allow for general time-dependent
mechanism in the penultimate section.
The importance of a privately observed arrival time is also investigated in Deb (2014) and
Garrett (2017). In contrast to the present work, these papers do not investigate a stationary
environment. Instead, while the mechanism starts at time t = 0, the buyer may arrive at
a later time. The main concern therefore is how to encourage the early arrivals to contract
early. In a setting with either a durable good or a non-durable good, respectively, these
authors find that the optimal mechanism treats early arriving participants more favorably
than late arriving participants. The late arriving participants face less favorable prices and
purchase lower quantities than the early arrivals.
There are related concerns with the emphasis on the ex-ante participation constraints in
the literature on dynamic mechanism design that pursue different directions from the one
presented here. Lobel and Paes Leme (2019) question the unlimited ability of the seller to
commit to make only a single offer to the buyer. They suggest that while the seller may
have “positive commitment” power, she may lack in “negative commitment” power. That
is, he can commit to any contractual promise, but may not be able to commit never to make
any further offer in the future. They show that in a finite horizon model with a sequence
of perishable goods, the equilibrium is long-term efficient and that the seller’s revenue is a
function of the buyer’s ex ante utility under a no commitment model. Skreta (2006, 2015)
and Deb and Said (2015) also investigate the sequential screening under limited commitment
by the seller.
A more radical departure from the ex-ante or interim participation constraint to expost participation constraints is suggested in recent work by Krähmer and Strausz (2015)
and Bergemann et al. (2017). These papers re-consider the sequential screening model of
Courty and Li (2000). In this two-period setting, where information arrives over time and
the allocation of a single object can be made in the second period, they impose an ex-post
participation rather than an ex-ante participation constraint. In consequence the power
7

of sequential screening is diminished and sometimes the optimal mechanism reduces to the
solution of the static mechanism. Ashlagi et al. (2016) investigate the performance guarantees
that can be given with ex-post participation constraints in a setting where a monopolist sells
k items over k periods.

2

Model

2.1

Payoffs and Allocation

We consider a stationary model with a single seller and a single representative buyer (who
we think of as representing a unit continuum of buyers). We alternately refer to the designer
as the seller (she) and the agent as the buyer (he).
Time is continuous and indexed by t ∈ [0, ∞). The buyer departs and gets replaced
with a newly arriving buyer at rate γ > 0. We denote by i the buyer who arrived i-th to
the market.3 We denote the random arrival time of buyer i by αi ∈ R+ and the random
departure time by Ti = αi+1 ∈ R+ .
The seller and the buyers discount the future at the same rate r > 0. At each point
in time t, the buyer demands one unit of the good. The flow valuation of buyer i at time
t ∈ [αi , Ti ] is denoted by θti ∈ R+ , the quantity allocated to buyer i at time t is xit ∈ [0, 1],
and pit is the flow payment from the buyer to the seller. His flow preferences are represented
by a (quasi-)linear utility function
uit = θti xit − pit ,

(1)

We assume that the arrival and departure time of each buyer are independent of his
valuation process. The valuation of buyer i, θαi i ∈ R+ , at the time of his arrival αi is
distributed according to the cumulative distribution function
 
F : 0, θ → R,
with strictly positive, bounded density f = F 0 > 0 on the support. The prior distribution
3

One can equivalently think of a continuum of buyers that is present at every point in time, where buyers
arrive and leave with rate γ. The average behavior of such a continuum of buyers will match the expected
behavior of a single representative buyer. The main advantage of the representative buyer model is that
it avoids technical issues due to integration over a continuum of independent random variables, which is
formally not well defined in standard probability theory, see e.g. Judd (1985).
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F is the same for every buyer i and every arrival time αi .
The valuation of each buyer evolves randomly over time, independent of the valuation
of other buyers. We assume that each buyer’s valuation (θti )t∈[αi ,∞) follows a geometric
Brownian motion, i.e. solves the stochastic differential equation:
dθti = σ θti dWt ,

(2)

where (Wt )t∈R+ is a Brownian motion and σ ∈ R+ is the volatility which measures the speed
of information arrival. The geometric Brownian motion forms a martingale and consequently
the buyer’s best estimate of his valuation at any future point in time is his current valuation,
i.e. for all s ≥ t :
 
Et θsi = θti .
Furthermore, θti takes only positive values, and so the buyer’s valuation for the good is always
positive.
Each buyer i seeks to maximize his discounted expected net utility given his valuation
i
θαi at his arrival time αi :
ˆ

Ti

e

E

−r(t−αi )

θti xit

−

pit



dt |

αi

θαi i ,


αi .

To simplify notation and without loss of generality we assume that the first buyer arrives at
time zero α0 = 0.
The seller seeks to maximize the expected discounted net revenue collected from her
interaction with the sequence of all buyers:
"
E

∞ ˆ
X
i=0

Ti

#
e−r t pit dt .

αi

This objective captures equivalently the total discounted revenue from a continuum of buyers.

9

2.2

Stationary Mechanism

A mechanism specifies, after each history, a set of messages for each buyer and the allocation
as well as the transfer as a function of the complete history of messages sent by this buyer.
Throughout, we impose that the allocation and transfer are independent of a buyers identity
i.4 The allocation process (xt ) specifies whether or not the buyer consumes the good at any
point in time. We assume that the allocation of the object is reversible, i.e. the seller can
give the buyer an object for some time and then take it away later.
Definition 1 (Mechanism).
A mechanism (x, p) specifies at every point in time t ∈ R+ , where some buyer i is active
t ∈ [αi , Ti ), the allocation xt ((mis )αi ≤s≤t ) as well as the transfer pt ((mis )αi ≤s≤t ) as a function
of the messages (mis )αi ≤s≤t sent by this buyer prior to time t.
A direct mechanism is a mechanism where the buyer reports his arrival and his valuations
to the mechanism.
Definition 2 (Direct Mechanism).
A direct mechanism (x, p) specifies at every point in time t ∈ R+ , where some buyer i is


active t ∈ [αi , Ti ), the allocation xt αi , (θsi )αi ≤s≤t as well as the transfer pt αi , (θsi )αi ≤s≤t
as a function of the arrival time αi and the valuations (θsi )αi ≤s≤t reported by this buyer prior
to time t.
As our environment is stationary, we restrict attention to stationary mechanisms where
the allocation and transfers are independent of the arrival time of the buyer. More formally, we require that a buyer who arrives at time α and whose valuations follows the
path (θs )s∈[α,T ] , receives the same allocation as a buyer who arrives at time α0 and his valuations follows the same path of valuations shifted by the difference in arrival times, i.e.
θs0 = θs+(α−α0 ) for all s ∈ [α0 , α0 + T − α]. Thus, the seller cannot discriminate the buyer
based on his arrival time.

4

The restriction to mechanisms where each buyer’s allocation and transfer is only a function of his own
messages is without loss of generality in the following sense: In the continuum interpretation of the model,
the seller cannot detect if a buyer misreports his arrival time. Furthermore as the valuations of different
buyers are independent the revenue maximization problem is independent between different buyers and so
will be the optimal mechanism.
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Definition 3 (Stationary Direct Mechanism).
A direct mechanism (x, p) is stationary if for all arrival times α, α0 and valuation paths θ:


xt α, (θs )α≤s≤t = xt+(α0 −α) α0 , (θs )α≤s≤t ,


pt α, (θs )α≤s≤t = pt+(α0 −α) α0 , (θs )α≤s≤t .

2.3

Progressive Mechanism

By the revelation principle we can, without loss of generality, restrict attention to direct
mechanisms where it is optimal for the buyer to report his arrival time α and his valuation
θt truthfully at every point in time t. Define the indirect utility Vα : R+ → R of a buyer who
arrives at time α with a value of θα and reports his arrival and his valuations (θt )t truthfully
by:
ˆ

T
−r (t−αi )

e

Vα (θ) = E
i
ˆα∞

θti xit

−(r+γ) (t−αi )

e

=E



−



pit

θti xit

dt | αi =

−

pit

α, θαi i

dt | αi =

αi


=θ

α, θαi i


=θ .

The above equality follows immediately from the law of iterated expectations and the fact
that the departure time Ti of the buyer is independent of the arrival time αi and the valuation
process θi and hence of xit , pit .5
It is optimal for the buyer to report truthfully if
ˆ
Vα (θα ) ≥

∞

e

sup E
α̂≥αi ,(θ̂t )

−(r+γ) (t−αi )

α̂



θti

x̂it

−

p̂it )

dt | αi =

α, θαi i


=θ ,

(IC)

where the allocation x̂it = xt (α̂, (θ̂s )α̂≤s≤t ) as well as the payment p̂it = pt (α̂, (θ̂s )α̂≤s≤t is a
function of the reported arrival time α̂ as well as all previously reported valuations (θ̂s )α̂≤s≤t .
We note here that the supremum in (IC) is taken over stopping times α̂ as the buyer can
condition his reported arrival on his willingness to pay for the good.
We restriction attention to mechanisms where the buyer participates voluntarily, i.e. for
all arrival times α and all initial values θα , the buyer’s expected utility from participating in
the mechanism is non-negative:
Vα (θα ) ≥ 0 .
(PC)
5

See Lemma 4 in the Appendix.
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While imposing incentive compatibility constraints (IC) as well as participation constraints (PC) is standard in the literature on (dynamic) mechanism design, we note that
the incentive compatibility constrained (IC) imposed here is stronger than the one usually
imposed in the literature. As the arrival time α is not observable to the seller, she has to
provide incentives for the buyer to report his arrival truthfully. In fact the incentive constraint (IC) we impose implies the participation constraint (PC) as the buyer can always
decide to never report his arrival α̂ = ∞. The seller seeks to maximize her revenue subject to
the incentive and participation constraints, and we refer to it as the progressive mechanism
design problem.

3

Revenue Equivalence

We denote by M the set of all incentive compatible stationary mechanisms where every
buyer participates voluntarily. A first observation that follows from the independence of the
values across the buyers is that we can rewrite the objective of the seller only in terms of
the revenue collected from the interaction with a single buyer.
Lemma 1 (Expected Revenue).
The expected discounted revenue in the optimal mechanism equals
r+γ
max E
r (x,p)∈M

ˆ

Ti



e−r (t−αi ) pit dt

,

αi

where i is an arbitrary buyer.
The proofs for all the results are relegated to the Appendix. In a stationary direct
mechanism, the allocation and transfer depend only on the time which elapsed since the
buyer arrived. We can therefore, without loss of generality, assume that the buyer arrived
at time zero α = 0 (or chose i = 0), to determine the revenue the seller derives from her
interaction with the buyer. To simplify the notation, we will drop the sub-index indicating
the buyer’s arrival as well as his identity and denote by V (θ0 ), the indirect utility of the
buyer when he arrived at time 0 with initial valuation θ0 .
As a first step in the analysis, we establish that the progressive mechanism design problem
can be related to a static auxiliary problem. In this static problem the buyer reports only
his initial valuation and the seller chooses a discounted expected quantity q ∈ R+ to allocate
to the buyer. It turns out that in any incentive compatible mechanism, both the value of
the buyer as well as the revenue of the seller are only a function of this quantity.
12

We define the “expected aggregate quantity” q : Θ → R+ which is allocated to a buyer
with initial valuation θ0 by
ˆ
q(θ0 ) , E

∞
−(r+γ) t

e
0



σ2
xt exp − t + σ Wt dt | θ0 .
2


(3)

The first term inside the integral is simply the discounted quantity in period t:
e−(r+γ) t xt .
The second term is the derivative of the valuation θt in period t with respect to the initial
value θ0 :6
 2

dθt
σ
= exp − t + σ Wt ,
dθ0
2
The above derivative represents the influence that the initial value θ0 has on the future
state θt . In Bergemann and Strack (2015), we referred to it as stochastic flow, and it is
the analogue of the impulse response function in discrete time dynamic mechanism (see
Pavan et al. (2014), Definition 3). Thus, the “expected aggregate quantity” q(θ0 ) weighs
the discounted quantity with the corresponding stochastic flow, or information rent that
emanates from the initial value.
As the quantity xt is bounded between 0 and 1 and the exponential term is a martingale,
it follows that the aggregate quantity is bounded as well, i.e. for all θ ∈ [0, θ]
0 ≤ q(θ) ≤

1
.
r+γ

(4)

We can complete the description of the static auxiliary problem with the introduction of the
virtual value and denote by:
1 − F (θ)
(5)
J(θ) , θ −
f (θ)
the “virtual flow value” of the buyer upon arrival to the mechanism. We denote by
θ◦ , inf{θ : J(θ) ≥ 0},

(6)

the lowest type with a non-negative virtual value. We assume that the distribution of initial
6

Here
 2 we used that the geometric Brownian motion can be explicitly represented as:
θ0 exp σ2 t + σWt .
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θt

=

valuations is such that θ 7→ min{0, f (θ)J(θ)} is non-decreasing.7
The expected quantity q and the virtual utility J are useful as they allow us to completely
summarize the expected discounted revenue of the seller and the value of the buyer:
Proposition 1 (Revenue Equivalence).
In any incentive compatible mechanism, the value of the buyer with initial valuation θ is:
ˆ

θ

V (θ) =

q(z)dz + V (0) ,

(7)

0

and the expected discounted revenue of the seller is:
ˆ

∞

e

E
0

−(r+γ) t



ˆ

θ

J(θ)q(θ)dF (θ) − V (0) .

pt dt =

(8)

0

Proposition 1 allows us to express the objective functions of the buyer and the seller in
terms of the discounted quantities q only. This result is an application of a general revenue
equivalence result, stated as Theorem 1 in Bergemann and Strack (2015). The particularly
transparent reduction here comes from the presence of the geometric Brownian motion and
the unit demand. By contrast, the reduction to an auxiliary static program extends to a
wide class of stochastic process and allocation problems. The next result establishes that
the function q must be increasing in any incentive compatible mechanism.
Proposition 2 (Monotonicity of Discounted Quantity).
In any incentive compatible mechanism the aggregate quantity q increases.
Proposition 1 and 2 follow from the the truth-telling constraint at time zero. Thus, they
provide only necessary conditions for incentive compatibility as they omit: (i) the possibility
to misreport the arrival, and (ii) the buyer’s truth-telling constraints after time zero. In
the next section, we establish that these two necessary conditions are sufficient if arrivals
are observable. Namely, for every monotone expected aggregate quantity q there exists a
mechanism that implements it (the mechanism where xt is constant). But significantly, the
monotonicity of q will not be sufficient with unobservable arrival.
7

This is a weak technical assumption which is satisfied for most standard distributions like the uniform
distribution, the exponential distribution, or the log-normal distribution. For example for the uniform
distribution U ([0, θ]) we have that f (θ)J(θ) = 2θ−θ
which is increasing in θ. For the exponential distribution
θ
n 


o
with mean µ > 0 we have that min{0, f (θ)J(θ)} = min 0, µθ − 1 exp − µ1 θ
which is also increasing in
θ.
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4

Sales Contract

We will derive the revenue maximizing mechanism for the seller when she does not observe
the arrival time of the buyer in Section 5. As a point of reference, it will be instructive
for us to first understand what the seller would do if the (individual) arrival time of each
buyer would be observable by the seller. With observable arrival, the optimal solution can
be implemented by sales contract. We first review these results in Section 4.1 and then
investigate in Section 4.2 how a sales contract performs with unobservable arrival .

4.1

Optimal Contract with Observable Arrival

With observable arrival time by the buyer, we are in the canonical dynamic mechanism design environment. In earlier work, Bergemann and Strack (2015), we derived the revenue
maximizing mechanism for a general environment of allocation problems and stochastic processes in continuous time. The current problem of interest, unit demand with values governed
by a geometric Brownian motion was a canonical problem of this general environment. We
establish that an implementation of the optimal mechanism is to offer the product for sale
at an optimally determined price P , see Proposition 8 of Bergemann and Strack (2015).
We described the revenue of the seller in Proposition 1. By the revenue equivalence
formula (8), the revenue of the seller is determined by the flow virtual value when the
uncertainty is given by the geometric Brownian motion. Thus, the optimal mechanism
awards the object to the buyer if his virtual value is positive upon arrival, formally if and
only if
J(θ0 ) ≥ 0.
Hence, it is optimal to maximize q(θ0 ) if J(θ0 ) ≥ 0 and minimize it otherwise. The optimal
allocation then awards the object to the buyer at all times s ≥ 0 if and only if his initial
valuation θ0 at arrival time t = 0 is sufficiently high:

xs =


1,

if θ0 ≥ θ◦ ;

0,

otherwise;

where the critical value threshold θ◦ is determined by
J(θ◦ ) = 0.
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Thus, the buyer receives the object forever whenever his initial valuation θ0 is above the
threshold value θ◦ . With observable arrivals this allocation can be implemented in a sales
contract where the seller charges a sales price of θ◦ /(r+γ), which entitles the buyer to ownership and continued consumption at all future times. An revenue-equivalent implementation
would be to sell the good at time t = 0 and then charge the buyer a constant flow price of
p◦ = θ ◦ ,
in all future periods, independent of his future value θs , for all s ≥ 0. Thus, the indirect
utility of the buyer when his arrival is observable equals


θ0 − θ◦
.
V (θ0 ) = max 0,
r+γ

4.2

Sales Contract with Unobservable Arrival

We now abandon the restrictive informational assumption of observable arrival and let the
arrival time be private information to each buyer. Let us first consider what would happen
if the seller were to maintain the above sales policy and offer the object for sale at the flow
price p, which could be the optimal observable price p◦ , as a stationary contract, at time
t = 0 and all future times. As we show in this section, any newly arriving buyers with
value close to p would conclude that rather than buy immediately, he should wait until he
learns more about his value, and purchase the object if and only if he learned that he has
a sufficiently high valuation for the object. Thus, the sale would occur (i) later and (ii) to
fewer buyers.
When deciding on the optimal purchase time in a sales contract the buyer faces an optimal
stopping problem. Purchasing the good later forces the buyer to delay his consumption, but
allows him to learn more about his value for the good and to potentially avoid an ex-post
sub-optimal purchasing decision. Recall that we denote by T the random time at which
the buyer leaves the market. If the buyer acquires the good at time t with valuation θt his
expected continuation utility is given by
ˆ

T
−r (s−t)

e

Et

ˆ


(θs − p) ds = (θt − p) Et

t

T
−r (s−t)

e
t


ds =

θt − p
.
r+γ

The first equality in the above equation follows from the fact that θ is a martingale (independent of T ) and thus the buyer’s value at time t is his best estimate of his value at
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later points in time. The second equality follows as the time T at which the buyer leaves
the market and thus stops consuming the good is (from a time t perspective) exponentially
distributed with mean t + 1/γ. The time τ at which the buyer optimally purchases the good
thus solves the stopping problem:
sup
τ



1
E e−r τ 1{τ <T } (θτ − p) .
r+γ

As the buyer leaves the market with rate γ this problem is equivalent to the problem where
the discount rate is given by (r + γ), i.e. the buyer solves the stopping problem
sup
τ



1
E e−(r+γ) τ (θτ − p) .
r+γ

(9)

The stopping problem given in (9) is the classical irreversible investment problem analyzed
in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 5, p.135 ff.). For a given sales price p, it leads to a
characterization of the buyer’s behavior in terms of a threshold w(p) that his valuation θτ
needs to reach at the stopping time τ .8
To simplify notation, we define a constant β that summarizes the discount rate r, the
renewal rate γ and the variance σ 2 in a manner relevant for the stopping problem :
1 1
β, +
2 2

r
1+8

r+γ
> 1.
σ2

(10)

Proposition 3 (Sales Contract).
In a sales contract with flow price p, the buyer acquires the object once his valuation θ reaches
a time independent threshold w(p) given by
w(p) ,

β
p.
β−1

(11)

The buyer’s value in this sales contract is given by

V (θ) =

β




1
1+γ





1
1+γ

(w(p) − p) ,

θ
w(p)

(w(p) − p) ,

8

if θ ≤ w(p);
if θ ≥ w(p).

Dixit and Pindyck (1994) consider an investment problem with a real asset. There, the geometric
Brownian motion may have a positive drift, α > 0. The positive quadratic root in their equation (16)
becomes (10) after setting the growth rate α, the drift of the geometric Brownian, to zero, or α = 0. Their
discount rate ρ becomes in our setting the sum of discount rate and renewal rate, thus ρ = r + γ, and the
difference between discount rate and growth, δ = ρ − α, is then simply the discount rate, or δ = ρ.
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We assumed that the valuation evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion for two
reasons that have now become apparent: First, it is invaluable for tractability. It allows us to
calculate the option value the buyer receives from delaying his decision to enter a contract in
closed form. It is exactly for this reason that most of the literature on irreversible investment
and the option value has focused on the geometric Brownian motion (c.f. Dixit and Pindyck,
1994). As a second benefit, this enables us to relate and interpret some of our results through
the lens of this classical literature. In particular, the buyer’s stopping problem when he is
offered a fixed price sales contract becomes a special case of the framework analyzed in Dixit
and Pindyck (1994).
We denote by τw(p) the (random) time at which the buyer purchases the good:
τw(p) , inf{t : θt ≥ w(p)}.
As w(p) > p, the buyer only purchases the good once his valuation is sufficiently above the
price p charged for the object. Thus, a buyer who starts with an initial value of θ0 below the
threshold w(p) expects to wait some random time until he hits any given threshold w(p).
With the geometric Brownian motion, we can compute the expected discounted time for a
buyer with initial value θ0 to hit any arbitrary valuation threshold x.
Lemma 2 (Expected Discounted Time).
The expected discounted time τx = inf{t : θt ≥ x} until a buyer’s valuation exceed a threshold
x conditional on the initial valuation θ0 is given by


E e−(r+γ) τx | θ0 = min

(

θ0
x

β

)
,1

.

(12)

Thus if the initial value θ0 exceeds the threshold x, then the expected discounted time
is simply 1, in other words there is no waiting at all. By contrast, if the initial value θ0 is
below the threshold x, then the expected discounted time is smaller when the gap between
the initial value θ0 and target threshold x is larger. The magnitude of the discounting is
again determined entirely by the constant β which summarizes the primitives of the dynamic
environment, namely r, γ and σ 2 , as defined earlier in (10).
Intuitively, the buyer has an option value of waiting and learning more about his valuation of the good and only purchases once the forgone utility of not purchasing the good is
sufficiently high. This is in sharp contrast to the classical dynamic mechanism design approach where the arrival time of the buyer is observable. When the arrival time is observable
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the seller can commit herself to not sell to the buyer in the future if the buyer does not
purchase the good immediately and thus the buyer can not delay his purchasing decision.
The buyer thus always buys the good immediately if his valuation exceeds the price p. The
information rent that the buyer gains from his ability to delay his purchasing decision is
called the “option value” and equals


E e−(r+γ) τw(p) (w(p) − p) − max {(w(p) − p), 0} .

(13)

From a dynamic mechanism design perspective the option value given in (13) corresponds
to an additional information rent the buyer receives due to his ability to delay entering a
contractual relation with the seller. As the option value is always positive, the buyer is, for
any fixed mechanism, unambiguously better off if he can delay his purchasing decision.
In contrast the effect of the buyer’s ability to delay the purchase on the seller’s revenue is
ambiguous in a sales contract. When the buyer delays his purchase the revenue of the seller
decreases. But to the extent, that some types of the buyer who would not have bought the
object upon arrival will do now later on, and after a sufficiently large positive shock on their
valuation, there are now additional revenues accruing to the seller.
Using the characterization of the purchase behavior of the buyer in Proposition 3 and
standard stochastic calculus arguments, we can completely describe the seller’s average revenue for a given sales contract.

Proposition 4 (Revenue of Sales Contract).
The flow revenue per time in a sales contract with flow price p is given by
p
Rsales (p) =
r

ˆ

(

∞

min
0

β−1 θ
β p

β

)
,1

f (θ) dθ .

(14)

Equation (14) reduces the problem of finding an optimal sales contract to a simple single
dimensional maximization problem over the price. It is worth noting that the revenue up to
a linear scaling depends on r, γ, σ only through β which implies that the optimal sales price
is only a function of β and the distribution of initial valuations F .
The expression inside the integral of (14) represent the expected quantity to be sold to
a buyer with initial value θ. In contrast to a standard revenue function under unit demand,
the realized quantities are not merely 0 or 1. Rather, the sellers offers positive quantity to
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all buyers, namely
(
min

β−1 θ
β p

β

)
,1 .

(15)

This expression reflects the expected discounted time the object is consumed for those buyers
β
p derived in
who have an initial value below the optimal purchase threshold w(p) = β−1
Proposition 3. The complete expression (15) then follow from Lemma 2 as the expected
discounted probability of a sale to a buyer with initial value θ. Thus, an increase in the sales
price p uniform lowers the probability of a sale for every value θ. The problem for the seller
with unobservable arrivals is therefore how to respond to slower and more selective sales.

4.3

Failure of Incentive Compatibility with Unobservable Arrival

We can now summarize some of our findings regarding the performance of a sales contract
in an environment with unobservable arrival. Suppose the seller would like to implement the
sales contract that was revenue maximizing under observable arrival in the new environment.
This sales contract sets the flow price p◦ equal to the threshold value θ◦ . In this contract,
any buyer with an initial value θ0 below θ◦ never gets the object and makes no payment
and thus his utility from the contract equals zero. We can now ask whether this contract
remains incentive compatible in the environment with unobservable arrival times. As shown
in Proposition 3 the buyer reacts to this contract by reporting his arrival only once his value
exceeds
β ◦
θ > θ◦ .
w(p◦ ) = w(θ◦ ) =
β−1
Hence all buyers with low valuations would deviate by not reporting their arrival immediately,
and the optimal contract with observable arrivals can not be implemented with unobservable
arrivals.
We can illustrate the payoff consequences by comparing the value functions of the buyer
across the two informational environments. The blue line depicts the value function for the
buyer in the setting with observable arrival time. The value is zero for all values below the
threshold θ◦ and then a linear function of the initial value. Notably, the value function has
a kink at the threshold level θ◦ . The red curve depicts the value function when the sales
contract is offered at the above terms as a stationary contract. Now, the value function is
smooth everywhere, and coincides with blue curve whenever the initial value weakly exceeds
the critical type w(p◦ ) Importantly, for all values θ0 below w(p◦ ), the red curve is above the
blue curve, which depicts the option value as expressed by (13). Notably, the value is strictly
20

V(θ0 )

2

1

0
0

0.5

θ*

p

3

θ0

Figure 1: This figure displays the value of the buyer as a function of her initial valuation in
a sales contract with flow price p = 1 when she has to participate immediately (blue) and
when she can delay her arrival (red) when β = 1.7.

positive for all initial values which expresses the fact that the option value guarantees every
value θ0 an information rent, quite distinct from the environment with observable arrival.
Perhaps surprisingly then, using a sequence of relaxation arguments we prove in Section
5, that the optimal mechanism (in the space of all incentive compatible mechanisms when
the buyers arrival to the mechanism is unobservable) remains a sales contract. Thus, (14)
can be used to identify the optimal mechanism. But importantly, as the current analysis
suggests, there is going to bea large gap between the optimal flow price p and the optimal
threshold w(p) with p < w(p).

5

The Optimal Mechanism

The discussion in the previous section illustrates that the first order approach will in general
fail once the buyer can misreport his arrival time. To solve this problem we will employ the
following strategy: First, we will identify particularly tractable necessary conditions for the
truthful reporting of arrivals, by considering a specific class of deviations in the arrival time
dimension. We then find the optimal mechanisms for the relaxed problem where we impose
only these necessary conditions using a novel result on optimization theory we develop.
Finally, we will verify that in this mechanism it is indeed optimal to report the arrival time
truthfully.
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5.1

Truthful Reporting of Arrivals

In the first step we find a necessary condition such that the buyer wants to report his arrival
immediately. Observe that if it were optimal for the buyer to reveal his presence to the
mechanism immediately, then the value from revealing his presence at any stopping time α̂
must be smaller than revealing his presence at time zero. As the buyer can condition the
time at which he reports his arrival to the mechanism on his past valuations, the following
constraint must hold for all stopping times α̂ which may depend on the buyers valuation
path (θt )t :9


V (θ0 ) ≥ sup E e−(r+γ) α̂ V (θα̂ ) | θ0 .
(IC-A)
α̂

We first show that the buyer’s value function V in any incentive compatible mechanism must
be continuously differentiable and convex.
Proposition 5 (Convexity of Value Function).
The value function in any incentive compatible mechanism is continuously differentiable and
convex.
The discussion in Subsection 4.3 illustrated that the indirect utility need not to be continuously differentiable in the optimal mechanism if the buyers arrival time is observable.
Intuitively, the constraint that the buyer must find it optimally to report his arrival immediately, (IC-A) implies that there cannot be kinks in the value function as this would
imply a first order gain for the buyer from the information he would get by waiting to report
his arrival. As the cost of waiting due to discounting are second order this implies that a
mechanism with a kinked indirect utility can not be incentive compatible.
In the next step, we will relax the problem by restricting the buyer to a small class of
deviations in reporting his arrival. The class of deviations we are going to consider is to have
the buyer report his arrival the first time his valuation crosses a time independent cut-off
x > θ0 :
τx = inf{t ≥ 0 : θt ≥ x} .
Note, that the optimal deviation of the buyer will not (necessarily) be of this form for every
direct mechanism. By restricting to deviations of this form we hope that in the optimal
mechanism the optimal deviation will be of this form and the restriction is non-binding.
9

This is a version of the revelation principle as the seller can replicate every outcome where the buyer
does not report his arrival immediately in a contract where the buyer reveals his arrival immediately, but
never gets the object before he would have revealed his arrival in the original contract.

22

5.2

Information Rents Associated with Unobservable Arrival

We established in Lemma 2 that the payoff from deviating to τx when reporting the arrival
time, while maintaining to report values truthfully, is given by:


−(r+γ) τx

E e





V (vτx ) | θ0 = V (x)

θ0
x

β

where β > 1 was defined in (10). The term


θ0
x

β

captures the discount factor caused by the time the buyer has to wait to reach a value of x
before participating in the mechanism. When the buyer then participates in the mechanism
he receives the indirect utility V (x) of a buyer whose initial value equals x. Now, in any
mechanism where (IC-A) is satisfied the buyer does not want to deviate to the strategy τx
we must have
 β
θ0
V (θ0 ) ≥ V (x)
⇔ V (x)x−β ≤ V (θ0 )θ0−β .
(16)
x
As (16) holds for all θ0 and x > θ0 , we have that the buyer does not want to deviate to any
reporting strategy (τx )x>θ0 if and only if V (x)x−β is decreasing. Taking derivatives yields
that this is the case whenever10
V (x)
.
(17)
V 0 (x) ≤ β
x
By the earlier revenue equivalence result, see Proposition 1, the derivative of the value
function V (θ) is equal to the aggregate quantity q(θ). We therefore have the following
proposition that derives a necessary condition on the aggregate quantity q for it to be optimal
for the buyer to report his arrival truthfully.
Proposition 6 (Upper Bound on Discounted Quantities).
The aggregate quantity is bounded from above by
q(θ0 ) = V 0 (θ0 ) ≤ β

V (θ0 )
θ0

(18)

in any mechanism where it is optimal to report arrivals truthfully, i.e. that satisfies (IC-A).
Intuitively, (18) bounds the discounted quantity a buyer of initial type θ0 can receive.
10

0 ≥ V 0 (x)x−β − βx−β−1 V (x) ⇒ V 0 (x) ≤ β V x(x) .
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Note, that (18) is always satisfied if the value function of all initial values θ0 of the buyer
from participating in the mechanism is sufficiently high. Intuitively, due to discounting the
buyer does not want to delay reporting his arrival when the value from participating is high.
As we can always increase the value to all types of the buyer, by possibly offering a subsidy
to the lowest type, we can reformulate (18) as a lower bound on the value V (0) of the lowest
type θ0 = 0.
Proposition 7 (Lower Bound on Information Rent).
In any mechanism which satisfies (IC-A) we have that

V (0) ≥ sup
θ∈Θ

θq(θ)
−
β

ˆ

θ


q(z)dz

.

0

The above result establishes a lower bound on the cost of providing the buyer with
incentives to report his arrival time truthfully. This lower bound depends only on the
allocation q. Intuitively, the seller may need to pay subsidies independent of the buyer’s
type to provide incentives for the buyer to report his arrival time truthfully if the quantity
q is too convex and the option value of waiting is thus too high.11 The subsidy would
correspond to a payment made to the buyer upon arrival and independent of his reported
value θ0 . Such a scheme makes delaying the arrival costly to the buyer due to discounting
and it is potentially very costly as it requires the seller to pay the buyer just for “showing
up”. We will show that in the optimal mechanism this issue will not be relevant as the
optimal mechanism does not reward the buyer merely for arriving.12
As a consequence of Proposition 7 we get an upper bound on the revenue in any incentive
compatible mechanism.
Corollary 1 (Revenue Bound).
An upper bound on the revenue in any incentive compatible mechanism is given by
ˆ

θ


q(z)J(z)dF (z) − max

0

θ∈[0,θ]

11

θq(θ)
−
β

ˆ

θ


q(z)dz

.

(19)

0

An immediate corollary from this formula is that it is infinitely costly to implement a policy which leads
to a value function V that admits a convex kink and thus has an infinite derivative V 0 = q at some point as
argued in Proposition 5.
12
Such subsidy schemes are also discussed in Gershkov et al. (2015, 2018) in a context where the buyer’s
values do not evolve over time. In contrast to our result Gershkov et al. (2015) show that to implement
the efficient allocation in this context such subsidies are sometimes necessary in order to to incentivize the
buyers to report their arrival time truthfully.
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The upper bound on revenue in (19) is obtained by considering only a small class of deviations. In particular, the buyer is only allowed to misreport his arrival via simple threshold
strategies, where he enters the mechanism once his valuation is sufficiently high. Economically,


ˆ θ
θq(θ)
q(z)dz
−
V (0) = max
β
θ∈[0,θ]
0
is a lower bound on the information rent the buyer must receive to ensure that he reports his
arrival truthfully in a mechanism which implements the allocation q. As discussed before,
this information rent is payed to the buyer in the form of a transfer that is independent of
his consumption and thus even those types receive who never consume the object. We note
that due to the maximum this information rent can not be rewritten as an expectation and
thus is fundamentally different from the classical information rent term. As a consequence,
pointwise maximization can not be used to find the optimal contract even in the relaxed
problem. We next develop the mathematical tools to deal with this type of non-standard
maximization problem.

5.3

The Optimal Mechanism

We now characterize the optimal mechanism. To do so we proceed by first finding the
allocation q that maximizes the upper bound on revenue (19). Second, we are going to
construct an incentive compatible mechanism that implements this allocation. As (19) is
an upper bound on the revenue, in any incentive compatible mechanism, we then found a
revenue maximizing mechanism.
A mathematical challenge is that, due to the information rent from arrivals, the relaxed
problem (19) is non-local and non-linear in the quantity q. A change of the quantity for one
type can affect the surplus extracted from all higher and lower types. Consider the relaxed
problem of finding the revenue maximizing mechanism such that the buyer never wants to
misreport his arrival using a cut-off stopping time. By Proposition 6, the indirect utility V
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of the buyer in this mechanism solves the optimization problem:
ˆ

θ

V 0 (z)J(z) f (z) dz − V (0),

max
V

(20)

θ

subject to

V (θ) ∈ 0,
0

1
r+γ


for all θ,

V is convex,
V 0 (θ) ≤ β

V (θ)
for all θ .
θ

(21)
(22)
(23)

We will further relax the problem by initially ignoring the convexity constraint (22) and
later verifying that the relaxed solution indeed satisfies the convexity condition. By the
revenue equivalence result, Proposition 1, we can restate the allocation problem in terms the
indirect utility of the buyer. The novel and important restriction is given by the inequality
(23) that states that the information rent of the buyer cannot grow too fast. The inequality
thus present an upper bound on the allocated quantity q(θ) = V 0 (θ).
We could approach the above problem as an optimal control problem where V (θ) is the
state variable and V 0 (θ) is the control variable. The presence of the derivative constraint
(23) which combines, in an inequality, the state and the control variable renders this problem
intractable. In particular, to the best of our knowledge the current problem is not directly
covered by any standard result in optimization theory.13 In particular, while a non-standard
version of the Pontryagin maximum principle with state dependent control constraints could
in principle be used to deal with the derivative constraint (23),14 this approach would lead
to a description of the optimal policy in terms of a multi-dimensional ordinary differential
equation (ODE). There seems to be no obvious way to infer the optimal policy from the
resulting ODE, and we could make this approach work only in special cases.
To avoid these issues, we adopt a proof technique that has proved useful in stochastic
optimal control as established by Peng (1992), see also Karoui et al. (1997) for a wide
range of applications of this technique. A comparison principle asserts a specific property
of a differential inequality if an auxiliary inequality has a certain property. An important
comparison result is Gronwall’s inequality that allows us to bound a function that is know
to satisfy a certain differential inequality by the solution of the corresponding differential
13

This constraint is fundamentally different from the Border constraint appearing in multi-buyer mechanism design problems which is a (weak) majorization constraint.
14
See for example Evans (1983) for a detailed introduction into the Pontryagin maximum principle.
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equation. Following standard arguments in the literature on comparison principles, we use
Gronwall’s inequality to establish the following lemma.
Lemma 3 (Comparison Principle).
Let g, h : [0, θ] → R be absolutely continuous and satisfy g 0 (θ) ≤ Φ(g(θ), θ) and h0 (θ) ≥
Φ(h(θ), θ) where Φ : R × [0, θ] → R is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in the first variable. If
g(0) ≤ h(0) we have that g(θ) ≤ h(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, θ].
We can then use the comparison principle to apply it the differential inequality constraint
(23) and give a characterization of the optimal solution.
Proposition 8 (An Optimization Problem with State Dependent Control Constraints).
Let Φ : R × [0, θ] → R+ be increasing and uniformly Lipschitz continuous in the first variable
as well as continuous in the second on every interval [a, θ] for a > 0.15 Let J : [0, θ] → R
be continuous, satisfy J (0) = −1 and z 7→ min{J (z), 0} be non-decreasing. Consider the
maximization problem:
ˆ θ
max
J (θ)w0 (θ)dθ − w(0) .
(24)
w

0

over all differentiable functions w : [0, θ] → R that satisfy w0 (θ) ≤ Φ(w(θ), θ). There exists
an optimal policy w to this problem such that for all θ ∈ (0, θ]
w0 (θ) = Φ(w(θ), θ) .
To apply Proposition 8 to the optimization problem given by (20), (21) and (23) we
define
J (θ) , f (θ)J(θ),
and



1
v
Ψ(v, θ) , min β ,
.
θ r+γ

An immediate observation is that J (0) = −1 . Applying Proposition 8 to the optimization
problem (20)-(23) by ex-post verifying that the solution is non-negative and convex, and
hence feasible, yields the following characterization of the relaxed optimal mechanism.

15

This means that for every a > 0, there exists a constant La < ∞ such that |Φ(v, θ) − Φ(w, θ)| ≤ La ·|v−w|
for all θ ∈ [a, θ].
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Theorem 1 (Optimal Control).
There exists a θ? ∈ [0, θ] such that a solution to the control problem (20)-(23) is given

V (θ) =





θ β θ? /β
,
θ?
r+γ
 θ? /β + θ−θ? ,
r+γ
r+γ

for θ ≤ θ? ,
for θ? ≤ θ,

.

(25)

We arrived at the optimization problem (20)-(23) by relaxing the original mechanism
design problem in two ways. First, we allowed the buyer to misreport his arrival only using
cut-off stopping times. Second, we ignored the monotonicity constraint associated with
truthful reporting of the initial value.
Proposition 9 (Posted Price Implementation).
The indirect utility given in (25) is implemented by a sales contract with a flow price of
p? =

β−1 ?
θ .
β

By Proposition 9, the allocation which maximizes the expected revenue under those
relaxed incentive constraints can be implemented using a sales contract. As the revenue
with relaxed incentive constraints is an upper bound on the revenue in the original problem
and this upper bound is achieved by some sales contract it follows that a sales contract is a
revenue maximizing mechanism.
Theorem 2 (Sales Contracts are Revenue Maximizing).
The flow price p? and the associated sales contract is a revenue maximizing mechanism with
unobservable arrivals.
We observe that the optimal allocation gives the object to the buyer forever. Hence, any
irreversibility constraint on the allocation is non-binding and thus the problem of irreversibly
selling the buyer an object yields the same solution.16 Thus, our optimal mechanism is also
revenue maximizing in a problem where the buyer consumes the object once and immediately,
the buyer is privately informed about his arrival, and the buyer’s valuation evolves over time.

16

For the case of observable arrivals this problem was analyzed in Board (2007) and Kruse and Strack
(2015).
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5.4

An Example: The Uniform Prior

We illustrate the results now for the case of the uniform prior, and assume that θ0 ∼ U [0, 1]
throughout this section.With the uniform prior we can then directly compute from the
revenue formula (14) the value threshold θ? and the associated flow price p? in the optimal
progressive participation mechanism:
11+β
,
2 β
1 β2 − 1
?
p =
.
2 β2
θ? =

In the dynamic mechanism, the value threshold and the associated price are determined
exclusively by the virtual value at t = 0, and thus under the uniform distribution, the
corresponding threshold and flow price are given by
1
θ ◦ = p◦ = .
2
Thus the price in the progressive mechanism is below the dynamic mechanism whereas the
threshold of the progressive mechanism is above the dynamic mechanism:
p? < p◦ = θ◦ < θ? .

(26)

In Figure 2 we display the behavior of the thresholds and the prices as a function of β ∈
(1, ∞). As β increases, the discounting rate and the renewal rate are increasing, and the
buyer becomes less forward-looking. As β decreases towards one, the gap between the value
threshold θ? and the price p∗ increases. As the option value becomes more significant, the
buyer chooses to wait until his value has reached a higher threshold, thus he will wait longer
to enter into a relationship with the seller. Faced with a more hesitant buyer, the seller
decreases the flow price as β decreases. Yet, the decrease in the flow price only partially
offsets the option value, and the buyer still waits longer to enter into the relationship with
the seller. In contrast, the threshold value, and the price, in the dynamic mechanism, θ◦ and
p◦ , respectively remain invariant with respect to the patience of the buyer β. An important
aspect of the progressive mechanism is that the buyer enters the relationship gradually rather
than once and for all, as in the dynamic mechanism. In Figure 3a we plot the probability
that an initial type drawn from the uniform distribution consumesthe object as a function
of the time since his arrival. In the dynamic mechanism, this probability is constant over
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β = 6 in green, observable arrival in red.

Figure 3
time. As all values θ0 above θ◦ = 1/2 buy the object, and all those with initial values
θ0 < θ◦ = 1/2 never buy the object, the probability of consumption does not change over
time, and is always equal to 1/2. By contrast, in the progressive mechanism, the probability of
participation is progressing over time, and thus the probability of consumption is increasing
over time. The geometric Brownian motion displays sufficient variance, so that eventually
every buyer purchases the product.
We now zoom in on the purchase behavior of the initial types θ0 . Figure 3b, quantity,
. illustrates the discounted expected consumption quantity q(θ0 ) as a function of the initial
valuation θ0 for various values of β. We find again that in the dynamic mechanism there
is a sharp distinction in the consumption quantities between the initial values below and
above the threshold of θ◦ = 1/2. By contrast in the progressive mechanism, the consumption
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quantity is continuous and monotone increasing in the initial value θ0 . As the buyer becomes
more patient, and hence as β decreases, the slope of the consumption quantity flattens outs
and the threshold θ? upon which consumption occurs immediately is increasing.
The differing thresholds and allocation probabilities give us some indication regarding the
contrasts in welfare properties between progressive and dynamic mechanism. As the price in
the progressive mechanism is uniformly lower, this allows us to immediately conclude that the
consumer surplus is larger in the progressive mechanism than in the corresponding dynamic
mechanism. Conversely, as the seller could have offered the progressive mechanism in the
dynamic setting, but did not, it follows that the revenue of the seller is uniformly lower in the
progressive mechanism. Thus, the option of the buyer to postpone his allocation is indeed
valuable and increases the consumer surplus significantly. This leaves open the question
as to how the social surplus is impacted by these different participation constraints. With
the uniform prior, we can further compute that the social welfare is uniformly larger in the
progressive than in the dynamic mechanism.
Significantly, the social welfare comparison does not extend to all prior distributions. In
particular, if there is only a small amount of private information, so that the static virtual
utility is non-negative for all initial values, then the dynamic mechanism will not distort
the allocation, and thus support the first best social welfare. For example, in the class of
uniform distribution on the interval [a, 1], the static virtual utility:
θ−

1 − F (θ)
f (θ)

is positive for all θ∈[a, 1] if the lower bound a in the support of the distribution is sufficiently
large, or a > 1/2. In these circumstances, the seller in the dynamic environment will cease
to discriminate against any initial value, and rather sell the object forever to all initial types
θ∈[a, 1]. By contrast, in the progressive mechanism, the option value remains an attractive
opportunity for all buyers, and thus the seller will never sell to all buyers irrespective of their
initial value θ∈[a, 1]. In consequence, the revenue maximizing progressive mechanism leads
to some initial inefficiency, and thus will not attain the first best.
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6

Conclusion

We considered a dynamic mechanism problem where each buyer is described by two dimensions of private information, his willingness to pay (which may change over time) and
his arrival time. We considered a stationary environment – in which the buyers arrive and
depart at random – and a stationary contract. In this arguably more realistic setting for
revenue management, the seller has to guarantee both interim incentive as well as interim
participation constraints. As the buyer has the valuable option of delaying his participation,
the mechanism has to offer incentives to enter into the relationship.
One challenge in our environment is that the first-order approach and other standard
methods fail as global incentive constraints bind in the optimal contract. We were able to
solve this multi-dimensional incentive problem by rephrasing the participation decision of the
buyer as a stopping problem, and then solve a new optimal control problem. More precisely,
we decomposed the progressive mechanism problem into an intertemporal participation (entry) problem and an intertemporal incentive problem. Given the separability between these
two problems, our approach can be possibly extended to allocation problems beyond the unit
demand problem considered here. There are (at least) three natural directions to extend the
analysis. First, the stochastic evolution of the value was governed by the geometric Brownian motion, and clearly other stochastic process could be considered. Second, the allocation
problem could be extended to nonlinear allocation problems rather than the unit demand
problem considered here. Third, a natural next step is to extend the techniques developed
here to multi-buyer environments, say competing bidders for a scarce resource. The final
generalization will pose new challenges as we will have to investigate whether the solution of
the individual stopping problem can be decentralized or distributed in a consistent manner
across the buyers. This is a problem similar to the reduced form auction as posed by Border
(1991) but now in dynamic rather than static allocation problem.
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Appendix

Lemma 4. We have that
ˆ
Vα (θ) = E

∞
−(r+γ) (t−αi )

e



θti xit



pit

−

dt | αi = α, θαi = θ .

αi

Proof. By the law of iterated expectations and the fact that the departure time of the buyer
Ti is independent of the arrival time αi and the valuation process θi and hence of xit , pit and
uit = θti xit − pit
ˆ

T

ˆ



e−r (t−αi ) uit dt

E

∞

= E

αi

i
ˆα∞

= E

ˆ



1{T ≥t} e−r (t−αi ) uit dt

∞





1{Ti ≥t} e−r (t−αi ) uit dt


=E
E
αi


ˆ ∞
−γ (t−αi ) −r (t−αi ) i
−r (t−αi ) i
e
e
ut dt .
P [T ≥ t] e
ut dt = E
αi

αi

Proof of Lemma 1. As each buyer’s allocation is only a function of his own reports and the
willingness to pay is independent between different buyers the law of iterated expectations
implies that the revenue can be rewritten as
"
E

∞ ˆ
X

αi+1

#

"

e−r t pit dt = E

αi

i=0

∞
X

e−rαi E

ˆ

αi+1

#
e−r (t−αi ) pit dt .

αi

i=0

As buyer are ex-ante identical they are necessarily treated the same in the optimal mechanism
which yields that the revenue equals
max E

(x,p)∈M

"∞ ˆ
X
i=0

αi+1

#
e−r t pit dt = max E

ˆ

(x,p)∈M

αi

αi+1

#
 "X
∞
e−r (t−αi ) pit dt E
e−rαi .

αi

i=0

Note, that αi+1 − αi = τi − αi are independently and identically exponentially distributed
with rate γ it follows from this that
"
E

∞
X

#
−rαi

e

"
=E

∞
X

i=0

i=0

=

∞
X
i=0

−rα0

e

i−1
Y

#
−r(αj+1 −αj )

e

j=0

i−1
∞ Y
 −rα0  X


=E e
E e−r(αj+1 −αj )
i=0 j=0

i
∞ 
 −r(αj+1 −αj ) i X
γ
r+γ
E e
=
=
.
r
+
γ
r
i=0
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This yields the result.

Proof of Proposition 1. As (θt )t≥0 is a geometric Brownian motion it can be explicitly represented as:

 2
σ
θt = θ0 exp − t + σWt .
(27)
2
The first part of the Proposition is a special case of Proposition 1 in Bergemann and Strack
(2015) and follows by applying the envelope theorem. As it is optimal for the buyer to report
his initial value θ0 truthfully we have that the derivative of the buyer’s indirect utility can
be calculated by treating (x, p) as independent of the buyers report
ˆ ∞

ˆ ∞



∂
∂
−(r+γ) t
−(r+γ) t
e
{xt θt − pt } dt | θ0 = E
e
xt
E
θt dt | θ0
V (θ) =
∂θ0
∂θ0
0
0

 2

ˆ ∞


σ
∂
−(r+γ) t
e
xt
θ0 · exp − t + σWt
dt | θ0
=E
∂θ0
2
0
 2


ˆ ∞
σ
−(r+γ) t
e
xt exp − t + σWt dt | θ0 = q(θ0 ) .
=E
2
0
0

As shown in Bergemann and
 Theorem 1, Proposition 8, and Equation 27) the
 Strack (2015,
1−F (θ0 )
and the expected revenue of the seller equals
virtual value is given by θt 1 − f (θ0 )
ˆ

∞
−(r+γ) t

e

E
0


ˆ ∞

 
1 − F (θ0 )
−(r+γ) t
pt dt = E
e
xt θt 1 −
dt
f (θ0 )
0
ˆ ∞

 
θt
1 − F (θ0 )
−(r+γ) t
=E
e
xt
θ0 −
dt − V (0)
θ0
f (θ0 )
0



ˆ ˆ ∞
θt
1 − F (θ0 )
−(r+γ) t
= E
e
xt
θ0 −
dt | θ0 f (θ0 )dθ0 − V (0)
θ0
f (θ0 )
0

 ˆ ˆ ∞

1 − F (θ0 )
θt
−r t
= θ0 −
E
e xt dt | θ0 f (θ0 )dθ0 − V (0) .
f (θ0 )
θ0
0

Plugging in the explicit representation of θt given by (27) yields that the expected revenue
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satisfies
ˆ

∞
−(r+γ) t

e

E
ˆ

0

=
0


pt dt

ˆ

θ

J(θ0 ) E
|

∞

e

−(r+γ) t

0

σ2
xt exp − t + σWt
2
{z




q(θ0 )


dt | θ0 f (θ0 )dθ0 − V (0) .
}

Proof of Proposition 2. The result follows as q plays the same role as the quantity in a static
allocation problem.

Proof of Proposition 3. The result follows from Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Section 5.2.

Proof of Lemma 2. For θ0 ≥ x, the buyer stops immediately and thus the statement is true.
For θ0 < x we have that
"


E e−(r+γ) τx | θ0 = E e−(r+γ) τx
"
=E e
"
=E e
2

2 2



θτx
θτx

β
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2
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− (r+γ) − σ2 β τx +βσWτx



θ0
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x

!β


| θ0 

#

β
| θ0



2 2
2
− (r+γ) + σ2 β− σ 2β τx − σ2 β 2 τ +β σ W
x
τx
2



e

θ0
x

β

#
| θ0 .

σ2 β 2

As (r + γ) + σ2 β − σ 2β = 0 and t 7→ e− 2 t+β σ Wt is a uniformly integrable martingale it
follows from Doob’s optional sampling theorem that


E e−r τx | θ0 = E

"

θ0
x

β

#
| θ0 .

Proof of Proposition 4. By Proposition 3 the buyer acquires the object once his valuation
β
exceeds θ? = β−1
p. By Lemma 1 the expected revenue the seller generates from a single
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buyer with initial valuation θ0 is given by
r+γ
E
r

ˆ

∞
−(r+γ) t

e
τθ ?



 p 

1 
p dt | θ0 = E e−(r+γ) τθ? p | θ0 = E e−(r+γ) τθ? | θ0
r
r
( 
)
(
β )
β
p
θ0
p
β − 1 θ0
= min
, 1 = min
,1 .
r
θ?
r
β p

Consequently, the expected discounted revenue from buyer with random initial valuation
distributed according to F is given by
p
r

ˆ

(

∞

min
0

β−1 θ
β p

β

)
,1

f (θ) dθ .

Proof of Proposition 5. It follows from the envelope theorem that the value function is continuous and convex in any mechanism where truthfully reporting the initial valuation is
incentive compatible. Furthermore, the envelope theorem implies that V is absolutely continuous, thus any non-differentiability must take the form of a convex kink. As it is never
optimal to stop in a convex kink it follows that V is differentiable.
Proof of Proposition 7. By Proposition 1 and 6 we have that IC-A implies that for all θ

θ q(θ)
⇔
−
β

ˆ

θ q(θ)
≤ V (θ) = V (0) +
β

ˆ

θ

q(z)dz
0

θ

q(z)dz ≤ V (0) .
0

Taking the supremum over θ yields the results.
Proof of Lemma 3. Define ∆ ≡ g − h. Suppose, that there exists a point θ0 such that
∆(θ0 ) > 0. As ∆(0) ≤ 0 and by the absolute continuity of ∆ there exists a point θ00 such
that ∆(θ00 ) = 0 and as ∆0 ≥ 0 we have that ∆(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ00 , θ0 ]. This implies that
there exists a constant L > 0 such that for all θ ∈ [θ00 , θ0 ]
∆0 (θ) = g 0 (θ) − h0 (θ) ≤ Φ(g(θ), θ) − Φ(h(θ), θ) ≤ |Φ(g(θ), θ) − Φ(h(θ), θ)|
≤ L |g(θ) − h(θ)| = L |∆(θ)| = L ∆(θ) .
0

By Gronwall’s inequality we thus have that ∆(θ0 ) ≤ ∆(θ00 )eL(θ −θ
the assumption that ∆(θ0 ) > 0 .
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00 )

= 0 which contradicts

Lemma 5 (Generalized Comparison Principle).
Let g, h : [0, θ] → R be absolutely continuous and satisfy g 0 (θ) ≤ Φ(g(θ), θ) and h0 (θ) ≥
Φ(h(θ), θ) where Φ : R × [0, θ] → R is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in the first variable. If
g(θ̂) = h(θ̂) we have that g(θ) ≤ h(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ̂, θ] and g(θ) ≥ h(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, θ̂] .




Proof. The first part of the result follows by considering the functions g̃(s) = g θ̂ + s , h(s) =


ȳ θ̂ + s and applying Lemma 3. The second part follows by considering the functions




g̃(s) = −g θ̂ − s , h̃(s) = −h θ̂ − s for s ∈ [0, θ̂] and applying Lemma 3 which implies
that for all s ∈ [0, θ̂]








g̃(s) ≤ h̃(s) ⇔ −g θ̂ − s ≤ −h θ̂ − s ⇔ g θ̂ − s ≥ h θ̂ − s .
Lemma 6.
Suppose that J : [0, θ] is a non-decreasing function with J (θ) ≤ 0, and g, h : [0, θ] → R are
absolutely continuous with g = h then
ˆ

ˆ

θ

θ

0

J (θ)h0 (θ)dθ + J (0)h(0) .

J (θ)g (θ)dt + J (0)g(0) ≤
0

0

Proof. The result follows from partial integration, the assumption that J (θ) ≥ 0
ˆ

ˆ

θ
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θ
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θ
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θ

J (θ)h0 (θ)dθ + J (0)h(0).

=
0

Proof of Proposition 8. Let g be an arbitrary feasible policy inthe optimization problem (24).
Define θ? = inf{θ : J (θ) ≥ 0}. As J is continuous J (θ? ) = 0. Let h : [0, θ] → R be the
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solution to
h0 (θ) = Φ(h(θ), θ),
h(θ? ) = g(θ? ) .
The proof proceeds in two step: first we establish that h leads to a higher value of the integral
(24) above θ? and in the second step we establish the analogous result below θ? .
Step 1: As g 0 (θ) ≤ Ψ(g(θ), θ) it follows from Lemma 5 that g(θ) ≤ h(θ) for θ ∈ [θ? , θ]
and g(θ) ≥ h(θ) for θ ∈ [a, θ? ] for every a > 0. As g and h are continuous it follows that
g(0) ≥ h(0) . The monotonicity of Φ in the first variable implies that for θ ≥ θ?
g 0 (θ) ≤ Φ(g(θ), θ) ≤ Φ(h(θ), θ) = h0 (θ) .
As J (θ? ) = 0 and θ 7→ min{J (θ), 0} is non-decreasing we have that J (θ) ≥ 0 for θ ≥ θ? we
have that
ˆ

ˆ

θ

θ

0

J (θ)h0 (θ)dθ .

J (θ)g (θ)dθ ≤
θ?

(28)

θ?

Step 2: Note, that by Lemma 5 g(θ) ≥ h(θ) for θ ≤ θ? . Furthermore, by definition of θ?
we have that J (θ) = min{J (θ), 0} for θ ≤ θ? . As θ 7→ min{J (θ), 0} is non-decreasing J (θ)
is non-decreasing for θ ≤ θ? . Lemma 6 implies that
ˆ

ˆ

θ?
0

J (θ)h0 (θ)dθ + J (0)h(0) .

J (θ)g (θ)dθ + J (0)g(0) ≤
0

θ?

(29)

0

Combining the inequalities (28) and (29) with the assumption that J (0) = −1 yields
that
ˆ θ
ˆ θ
0
J (θ)g (θ)dt − g(0) ≤
J (θ)h0 (θ)dθ − h(0) .
0

0

As Φ is continuous in both variables it follows that h is continuously differentiable and thus
feasible and an optimal policy.

Proof of Proposition 1. Define J (θ) = J(θ)f (θ) and recall that θ◦ = min {θ : J (θ) = 0} .
We first note, that J (θ) is negative for θ < θ◦ and J (0) = −1. Consider the problem of
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solving
ˆ

θ

V 0 (z)J (z) dz − V (0) .

max
V

0
0



subject to V (θ) ≤ Ψ(V (θ), θ) for all θ∈ θk , θ ,
n
o
v
1
where Ψ(v, θ) = min β θ , r+γ . By Proposition 3 we have that there exists an optimal
policy that solves
V 0 (θ) = Ψ(v, θ)
(30)
We have that all solutions to the ODE (30) are of the form

V (θ) =

where

1
r+γ

= V 0 (θ? ) =

β
V
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θ β
0
θ

V (θ? )

V (θ? ) +

for θ ≤ θ?

θ−θ?
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for θ ≤ θ?

(θ? ) . Thus, plugging in V (θ? ) yields that

V (θ) =





θ β θ? /β
θ?
r+γ
? /β
?
θ

+ θ−θ
r+γ
r+γ

for θ ≤ θ?
for θ ≤ θ?

.

We note that V = 0 and V 0 is increasing. It is thus feasible in the control problem (20)-(23)
and we hence have found an optimal policy.
Consider the sales contract where the object is sold at a flow price of p = β−1
θ? . Propoβ
sition 3 yields that the buyer’s value is given by

V (θ) =





1
r+γ
1
r+γ


θ β 1 ?
θ
θ?
β


θ−

β−1 ?
θ
β

for θ ≤ θ?


and thus satisfies (25) which establishes the result.
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for θ ≥ θ?

,

